Stuck in the pleistocene: rationality and evolved social roles.
This article argues that an evolutionary psychological perspective could be useful for developing second-generation models of rationality. The standard model of complete rationality is inadequate primarily on the grounds that it generates predictions inconsistent with empirical data. The model is extremely useful and should not, nor cannot, realistically be dismissed. It accurately predicts outcomes in markets and openly competitive situations. However, behavioral phenomena that the standard theory has trouble explaining -- such as mass contribution to public goods, types of cooperation, and altruism -- are usually treated as "anomalies." These outcomes are too prevalent and important to be treated as such. I attempt to build upon Elinor Ostrom's proposal to generate new models of rationality, which recognize the use of heuristics, norms, and rules, and are able to better account for empirical findings. I argue that second-generation models would benefit from the acknowledgment of social roles -- but more specifically, evolved social roles. Evolved social roles are intuitive bundles of norms, expectations, and social strategies that shape an individual's player type. If we extend rationality to incorporate underlying biopsychological mechanisms, such as evolved social strategies and evolved social roles, then we gain an understanding of a wider array of decision-making processes and social phenomena.